P2pbgpsec

Projects
Participants
Skills
Status	Dormant
Niche	Software
Purpose	Infrastructure

Peer 2 Peer BGP Security

wiki page for participants of p2p-sec mailing list: https://lists.puscii.nl/wws/arc/p2p-sec

Objectives

• to contribute to creation and implementation of the distributed/decentralized (web-of-trust) BGP security.
• to create connections between people who share simmilar concerns about the upcoming introduction of hierarchical BGP-security structures, based on PKI/X.509 technology
• to provide space for disscussion & exchange of opinions, news, materials
• to co-ordinate the efforts among various groups that work on the above topics

Problem statements

Internet Governance view

• • excellent summary by Milton Mueller, Brenden Kuerbis. (2010,09).
    "Building a new governance hierarchy: RPKI and the future of Internet routing

and addressing. Retrieved from Internet Governance Project: http://internetgovernance.org/pdf/RPKI-VilniusIGPfinal.pdf

• • "Negotiating a New Governance Hierarchy: An Analysis of the

Conflicting Incentives to Secure Internet Routing"
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2021835

Technical view

• How broken is SSL: a talk by Moxie Marlinspike: "SSL And The Future Of Authenticity" at Defcon 2011:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z7Wl2FW2TcA

• Basic threat scenario: Man in the Middle attack / prefix hijacking,

presented at Defcon, 2008, by Pilosov/Kapela: http://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-16/dc16-presentations/defcon-16-pilosov-kapela.pdf

• Enisa report on the routing security: :

http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/res/technologies/tech/routing/state-of-the-art-deployment-and-impact-on-network-resilience

• Jeroen Massar's presentaton on Routing Security

http://www.swinog.ch/meetings/swinog21/p/14_SwiNOG21%20-%20Security,%20DDOS%20Mitigation,%20AntiSpam.ppt

• Sharon Goldberg: Should we secure routing with the RPKI (19 September 2013) , Princeton CS

http://www.cs.princeton.edu/ajax/abstract/467

• Is the Juice Worth the Squeeze? BGP Security in Partial Deployment

Robert Lychev, Sharon Goldberg, Michael Schapira. SIGCOMM'13, Hong Kong, China. August 2013.

  http://arxiv.org/pdf/1307.2690v1
  http://arxiv.org/abs/1307.2690

• Impacting IP Prefix Reachability via RPKI Manipulations

Kyle Brogle, Danny Cooper, Sharon Goldberg and Leonid Reyzin. Boston University Technical Report. January 4, 2013.

  http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe/papers/RPKImanip.pdf
  http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe/papers/RPKImanip.html

Possible alternative technical approaches

• "trust agility", a talk by Moxie Marlinspike: "SSL And The Future Of Authenticity" at Defcon 2011:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z7Wl2FW2TcA

• http://convergence.io/
• Soveregn Keys, Peter Eckersley from EFF mp4 HQmp4 LQ

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/11/sovereign-keys-proposal-make-https-and-email-more-secure

• "Trusted BGP Observers, an extension to RPKI"

Current solution: RPKI & sBGP

• IETF wg: SIDR (secure InterDomain Routing)
• Software: http://www.rpki.net/
• RIPE NCC: https://www.ripe.net/lir-services/resource-management/certification
• Public discussion in European region: (articles, mailing lists, links)

http://www.ripe.net/lir-services/resource-management/certification/community-development

In the news & blogs

• Malcolm Hutty, from London Internet Exchange:

https://publicaffairs.linx.net/news/?p=6118

• RIPE Members Vote To Continue RPKI Work, Nov 03, 2011 11:44 AM PDT

By Michele Nylon http://www.circleid.com/post/20111103_ripe_members_vote_to_continue_rpki_wo rk/

• RPKI for PI users in RIPE region:

http://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/ncc-services-wg/2013-March/002212.html

• NANOG: SIngle trust anchor?

http://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2013-August/060199.html

• GOVERNMENTS WANT SUSPENDERS FOR SECURE ROUTING (24 September 2013)

http://www.internetgovernance.org/2013/09/24/keep-your-pants-on-governments-want-suspenders-for-secure-routing/

After PRISM

• http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/on-nsa.html

"there's a circumstantial case that the NSA and GCHQ are either directly accessing Certificate Authority keys** or else actively stealing keys from US providers, possibly (or probably) without executives' knowledge. This only requires a small number of people with physical or electronic access to servers, so it's quite feasible.*** The one reason I would have ruled it out a few days ago is because it seems so obviously immoral if not illegal, and moreover a huge threat to the checks and balances that the NSA allegedly has to satisfy in order to access specific users' data via programs such as PRISM."

• https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/the_nsa_is_brea.html

(NSA breaking crypto, SSL, etc, by Schneider )

Meshnets media

See also: Privacy_Software_Workshop_Series#Mesh_networks

& http://wiki.techinc.nl/index.php/Privacy_Software_Workshop_Series#Mesh_networks

• Becha's article with many links:

http://becha.home.xs4all.nl/hackers-philosophers-utopian-network-dec-2012-becha.pdf