P2pbgpsec

Projects
Participants
Skills
Status	Dormant
Niche	Software
Purpose	Infrastructure

Peer 2 Peer BGP Security

wiki page for participants of p2p-sec mailing list: https://lists.puscii.nl/wws/arc/p2p-sec

Objectives

• to contribute to creation and implementation of the distributed/decentralized (web-of-trust) BGP security.
• to create connections between people who share simmilar concerns about the upcoming introduction of hierarchical BGP-security structures, based on PKI/X.509 technology
• to provide space for disscussion & exchange of opinions, news, materials
• to co-ordinate the efforts among various groups that work on the above topics

Problem statements

• Internet Governance view:
  • excellent summary by Milton Mueller, Brenden Kuerbis. (2010,09).
    "Building a new governance hierarchy: RPKI and the future of Internet routing

and addressing. Retrieved from Internet Governance Project: http://internetgovernance.org/pdf/RPKI-VilniusIGPfinal.pdf

• • "Negotiating a New Governance Hierarchy: An Analysis of the

Conflicting Incentives to Secure Internet Routing"
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2021835

• Techical view:

• • How broken is SSL: a talk by Moxie Marlinspike: "SSL And The Future Of Authenticity" at Defcon 2011:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z7Wl2FW2TcA

• • Basic threat scenario: Man in the Middle attack / prefix hijacking,

presented at Defcon, 2008, by Pilosov/Kapela: http://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-16/dc16-presentations/defcon-16-pilosov-kapela.pdf

• • Enisa report on the routing security: :

http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/res/technologies/tech/routing/state-of-the-art-deployment-and-impact-on-network-resilience

• • Jeroen Massar's presentaton on Routing Security

http://www.swinog.ch/meetings/swinog21/p/14_SwiNOG21%20-%20Security,%20DDOS%20Mitigation,%20AntiSpam.ppt

Possble alternative technical approaches

• "trust agility", a talk by Moxie Marlinspike: "SSL And The Future Of Authenticity" at Defcon 2011:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z7Wl2FW2TcA

• http://convergence.io/
• Soveregn Keys, Peter Eckersley from EFF mp4 HQmp4 LQ

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/11/sovereign-keys-proposal-make-https-and-email-more-secure

• "Trusted BGP Observers, an extension to RPKI"

Current solution: RPKI & sBGP

• Software: http://www.rpki.net/
• IETF wg: SIDR (secure InterDomain Routing)

Public discussion in European region: (articles, mailing lists, links) http://www.ripe.net/lir-services/resource-management/certification/community-development

In the news:

• Malcolm Hutty, from London Internet Exchange:

https://publicaffairs.linx.net/news/?p=6118

• RIPE Members Vote To Continue RPKI Work, Nov 03, 2011 11:44 AM PDT

By Michele Neylon http://www.circleid.com/post/20111103_ripe_members_vote_to_continue_rpki_wo rk/

Meshnets media

• http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/hacktivists-want-to-free-the-net-by-building-a-new-one-from-scratch

• Guify
• Hyperborea...
• FNF

• http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21929294.500-meshnet-activists-rebuilding-the-internet-from-scratch.html#.Ugn9zVO57zf

• http://www.wired.com/wiredenterprise/2013/08/indie-web/

• Becha's article with many links:

http://becha.home.xs4all.nl/hackers-philosophers-utopian-network-dec-2012-becha.pdf

After PRISM

• http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/on-nsa.html

"there's a circumstantial case that the NSA and GCHQ are either directly accessing Certificate Authority keys** or else actively stealing keys from US providers, possibly (or probably) without executives' knowledge. This only requires a small number of people with physical or electronic access to servers, so it's quite feasible.*** The one reason I would have ruled it out a few days ago is because it seems so obviously immoral if not illegal, and moreover a huge threat to the checks and balances that the NSA allegedly has to satisfy in order to access specific users' data via programs such as PRISM."