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| | * [[TacticalMediaRoom/Signal-Internet Governance and Infrastructure | Internet Governance and Infrastructure]] > Topics related to internet governance and infrastructure, including the friction between free internet and European sanction laws, the closure of ENOG (Eurasian Network Operators' Group), and the future of the internet as discussed by Vint Cerf. It also covers network resilience amid conflict, with specific examples such as the telecommunications blackout in Gaza and network data on power outages in Ukraine. | | * [[TacticalMediaRoom/Signal-Internet Governance and Infrastructure | Internet Governance and Infrastructure]] > Topics related to internet governance and infrastructure, including the friction between free internet and European sanction laws, the closure of ENOG (Eurasian Network Operators' Group), and the future of the internet as discussed by Vint Cerf. It also covers network resilience amid conflict, with specific examples such as the telecommunications blackout in Gaza and network data on power outages in Ukraine. |
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| − | * [[TacticalMediaRoom/Signal-Journalism and Media | Journalism and Media]] > The role of journalism and media in the ongoing war, the importance of secure communication tools, the role of hacktivists, and the impact of server-side blocking and embargo sanctions on internet splintering. It also discusses the goal of an open internet as discussed by RIPE NCC and the impact of the war on internet access in Ukraine and Russia. | + | * [[TacticalMediaRoom/Signal-Journalism Art and Media | Journalism, Art and Media]] > The role of journalism and media in the ongoing war, the importance of secure communication tools, the role of hacktivists, and the impact of server-side blocking and embargo sanctions on internet splintering. It also discusses the goal of an open internet as discussed by RIPE NCC and the impact of the war on internet access in Ukraine and Russia. |
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| | * [[TacticalMediaRoom/Signal-Publications, Essays, Presentations & Reports | Publications, Essays, Presentations & Reports]] > Publications, essays, presentations, and reports related to the ongoing war. It includes discussions on the historical context of the Russian attack on the Kyiv TV tower, the impact of the war on internet infrastructure and resilience, and the use of sanctions against the internet. | | * [[TacticalMediaRoom/Signal-Publications, Essays, Presentations & Reports | Publications, Essays, Presentations & Reports]] > Publications, essays, presentations, and reports related to the ongoing war. It includes discussions on the historical context of the Russian attack on the Kyiv TV tower, the impact of the war on internet infrastructure and resilience, and the use of sanctions against the internet. |
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| − | we will be sending out weekly email newsletters with the latest news, important projects and events regarding the ongoing war. please feel free to subscribe: http://eepurl.com/h1rkVz
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| − | = Internet Governance and infrastructure =
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| − | * https://www.groene.nl/artikel/altijd-apolitiek-opereren Hoe het vrije internet schuurt met Europese sanctiewetgeving
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| − | * Internet Society Netherlands op LinkedIn: Our open letter to election program committees is online: https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7123449064695738368/
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| − | * https://www.politico.eu/article/telecom-cable-sweden-estonia-damage-nato/ vulnerability of communications lines to the Moscow regime's open embrace of terrorism: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pJU-KYMREbQ
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| − | * ENOG (Eurasian Network Operators' Group) was established in June 2011 as a means to bring RIPE and the RIPE NCC closer to the local communities in Eurasia and to support Internet development in the region. "Sunsetting ENOG" story: shot: https://www.ripe.net/publications/news/announcements/sunsetting-enog
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| − | chaser: https://www.parisbeacon.com/ripe-ncc-shuts-down-exchange-platform-with-russia/
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| − | original: https://www.enog.org
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| − | discussion: https://enog-apps-2.ripe.net/hyperkitty/list/discuss@enog.org/thread/XGEYIYQWC6MRZ2VXEERH3QLDFU7XFCSD/
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| − | * ISOC NL we are looking for new board members https://isoc.nl/gezocht-isoc-nl-bestuursleden-f-m-x/
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| − | * Digital commons are a pillar of European digital sovereignty. We have teamed up with a number of organizations working on building Digital Commons and published an op-ed encouraging French and European policy makers to put Digital Commons at the center of the EU’s digital strategy. https://openfuture.eu/blog/digital-commons-are-a-pillar-of-european-digital-sovereignty/
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| − | * Vint Cerf Talks The Future Of The Internet - BBC Click https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U2AmxZ3V26s -
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| − | * Interesting read: 13 propositions, and the #12 is about sanctions on the Internet: https://blog.apnic.net/2022/07/19/13-propositions-on-an-internet-for-a-burning-world-12-13/
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| − | == Network Resilience Amid Conflict ==
| + | we will be sending out weekly email newsletters with the latest news, important projects and events regarding the ongoing war. please feel free to subscribe: http://eepurl.com/h1rkVz |
| − | * Telecommunications blackout in the Gaza Strip is an attack on human rights https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/communications-blackout-gaza-strip/
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| − | * 15 nov. 2022: Network data show that most regions of #Ukraine have been impacted by a nation-scale power outage amid intense Russian missile bombardment targeting critical infrastructure; 85 missile strikes confirmed today per President Zelensky 📰 Report: https://t.co/S0qJQ7CbNv” https://twitter.com/netblocks/status/1592549576531234816?s=46&t=PAh-XRummXUmRlxZQsdIBQ
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| − | * https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Regional-Presence/Europe/Documents/Interim%20assessment%20on%20damages%20to%20telecommunication%20infrastructure%20and%20resilience%20of%20the%20ICT%20ecosystem%20in%20Ukraine%20-2022-12-22_FINAL.pdf
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| − | * Forensic Architecture, about the historical context of the Russian attack on the Kyiv TV tower: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/russian-strike-on-kyiv-tv-tower/
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| − | * Level Up (https://level-up.cc/) is a community-owned platform designed to gather resources for the global digital safety training community.
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| − | * "Internet splintering due to server-side blocking and embargo sanction" https://twitter.com/francis_scarr/status/1533754156196016128?s=20&t=LoMpjsB25BPCexRpWh2NHA
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| − | * This was the session at RightsCon: https://rightscon.summit.tc/t/2022/events/internet-splintering-due-to-server-side-blocking-and-embargo-sanction-nv8ZxD4hyXemicsbVgyfhq
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| − | * An Open Internet Remains the Goal - New from RIPE NCC:https://labs.ripe.net/author/hans_petter_holen/an-open-internet-remains-the-goal/
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| − | * RPKI Training for Ukrainian Network Operators -> The RIPE NCC held online BGP Security training for Ukrainian telecom operators on 6 April: https://labs.ripe.net/author/alex-semenyaka/rpki-training-for-ukrainian-network-operators/
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| − | * What could be done, if there is political will, regarding the "technical sanctions" & blocking of the aggressive regimes/countries/networks:https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/pdf/draft-giuliano-blocking-considerations-00
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| − | * Report shared OONI data analysis on recent blocks that have emerged in Russia(and in the EU) amid the war in Ukraine. https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/
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| − | * Article > why the RIPE NCC remains fully compliant with the latest sanctions https://labs.ripe.net/author/athina/eu-sanctions-and-our-russian-membership/ -
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| − | * Data analysis & visualization relating to censorship. OONI discussion channel: https://join.slack.com/t/openobservatory/shared_invite/zt-16ndyhjcw-xC~h_CNBKBm0IFZI3zhwNQ
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| − | * https://pulse.internetsociety.org/blog/internet-perspectives-ukraine-and-russia
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| − | * A More Robust Approach to Sanctions: https://labs.ripe.net/author/chrisb/a-more-robust-approach-to-sanctions/
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| − | * Recent events in Ukraine have spotlighted some fundamental questions about Internet governance and the use of state-imposed sanctions. This post frames the discussion in reference to one of the Internet's most enduring maxims.RIPE NCC "position" : https://www.ripe.net/participate/member-support/the-ripe-ncc-and-ukraine-russia/
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| − | * To sanction or not to sanction the Internet access: A SancNet debate https://www.giga-net.org/to-sanction-or-not-to-sanction-the-internet-access-a-sancnet-debate/
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| − | * History of using sanctions against internet in Serbia (& history of war in ex-yugoslavia ) https://wiki.techinc.nl/TacticalMediaRoom#History
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| − | * https://coinmarketcap.com/alexandria/article/hydra-market-543-bitcoin-seized-as-world-s-biggest-darknet-platform-shut-down
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| − | * https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/yandex-data-center-in-finland-loses-power-runs-on-diesel-due-to-war-sanctions/
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| − | * https://labs.ripe.net/author/becha/spring-and-summer-events-season-2022/ Spring and Summer Events Season 2022 Ripe
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| − | == Internet Security ==
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| − | * Cryptography has failed to address the needs of the disenfranchised.But we can fix that! https://uwaterloo.ca/cybersecurity-privacy-institute/cpi-talk-crypto-people
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| − | * Secure communication tools, for non-techies https://labs.ripe.net/author/waehlisch/secure-personal-communication-in-the-event-of-crisis/ https://labs.ripe.net
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| − | * https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/03/telegram-harm-reduction-users-russia-and-ukraine
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| − | * https://cip.gov.ua/en/news/viktor-zhora-potencial-rosiiskikh-khakeriv-imovirno-pereocinenii
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| − | * https://www.ft.com/content/1fb2f592-4806-42fd-a6d5-735578651471
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| − | * https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2022/03/28/huge-cyberattack-on-ukrtelecom-biggest-since-russian-invasion-crashes-ukraine-telecom/?sh=43c99b0d7dc2
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| − | * Anonymous hacktivists warned that the next #OpRussia target will be corporations that refuse to pull their business from Russia as one group of hackers decided to try to use their data haul from a Russian company to financially help the people of Ukraine.
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| − | * https://www.hstoday.us/featured/anonymous-hackers-fire-warning-shot-at-companies-refusing-to-pull-out-of-russia/
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| − | == Network / Internet in Ukraine ==
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| − | * Ukraine faces second day of huge phone and internet outage after suspected Russian cyberattack Ukrainian authorities accused Russia's military intelligence unit of being responsible.
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| − | https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/ukraine-kyivstar-outage-down-russia-cyberattack-internet-phone-rcna129582
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| − | * https://mastodon.social/@runasand/110251282506443154 “I’ll give journalists in Ukraine pro-bono cybersecurity guidance, inc. security keys for enhanced two-factor auth for email and social media. If you know folks at Kyiv Independent, Kyiv Post or elsewhere who would benefit from this, please put us in touch: runa at granitt dot io.”
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| − | * Cyber security and resilience: Lessons from Ukraine https://cyber.harvard.edu/events/cyber-security-and-resilience-lessons-ukraine
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| − | * article about measuring Internet resilience in Ukraine https://labs.ripe.net/author/emileaben/the-resilience-of-the-internet-in-ukraine-one-year-on/
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| − | * Telecom operators in new territories will issue users' IP addresses in Russian - newspaper - https://fomag.ru/news-streem/operatory-svyazi-v-novykh-territoriyakh-oformyat-ip-adresa-polzovateley-na-rossiyskie-gazeta/
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| − | * https://www.heise.de/hintergrund/One-year-of-war-in-Ukraine-Operators-rebuild-networks-in-the-back-of-the-army-7529709.html
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| − | * https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Cyber-Reports-2022-06-IT-Army-of-Ukraine.pdf The IT Army of Ukraine Structure, Tasking, and Ecosystem Stefan Soesanto
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| − | * The Russification of Ukrainian IP Registration -In this article, Doug Madory uncovers the little-known “Russification” of Ukrainian IP addresses — a phenomenon that complicates the task of internet measurement and impacts Ukrainians connecting to the internet using IP addresses suddenly considered Russian.
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| − | www.kentik.com
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| − | & https://www.kentik.com/blog/the-russification-of-ukrainian-ip-registration/
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| − | * https://pulse.internetsociety.org/blog/internet-infrastructure-predictions-for-2023-ukraine-internet-to-prevail-central-asia-to-increase-internet-resiliance-in-response-to-war
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| − | * Keep Ukraine connect task force https://keepukraineconnected.org | https://labs.ripe.net/author/alun_davies/keep-ukraine-connected/ > story (podcast & article) about the project that was presented at non-public TMR meetup:
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| − | * Petition organized by Promote Ukraine and EUMANS: https://eukrainenow.eu <https://eukrainenow.eu>
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| − | * Saving Ukrainian Cultural Heritage Online We are saving digitised collections from Ukrainian museums, libraries and archives.https://www.sucho.org/
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| − | * The international surge to help keep Ukraine's frontlines connected https://www.cyberscoop.com/ukraine-internet-starlink-security/
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| − | * https://www.capacitymedia.com/article/29xf7phjbzu764hrrx8g0/kyivstar-works-to-re-connect-ukrainian-cities
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| − | * In the rubble of bombarded Ukrainian cities, technicians are risking their lives to keep the country online.https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2022/03/22/while-russians-bombs-fall-around-them-ukraines-engineers-battle-to-keep-the-internet-running/?sh=4a20aad35a4c
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| − | * Resiliency of the Internet in Ukraine Emile Aben, RIPE NCC https://ripe84.ripe.net/programme/meeting-plan/plenary/
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| − | * Dattalion – Ukraine's Data Battalion. Today at 14:30 (EEST), me and my colleagues are going to hold the first media briefing of Dattalion at Ukraine Media Center. The link to the event is available here https://youtu.be/d6HHk7u98Bc
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| − | * https://twitter.com/mykolska/status/1531188142958592000
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| − | == Russia's Internet Landscape ==
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| − | * https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2024/02/15/rusland-internet-ip-adres-amsterdam/ https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2024/02/15/rusland-internet-ip-adres-amsterdam/
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| − | * https://cybernews.com/cyber-war/russia-fsb-akado-internet-down-ukraine-it-army/ Moscow’s main internet provider, Akado Telecom, has been reported down for a third time since December, allegedly knocking out wifi access for several of Moscow's government agencies,
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| − | * https://www.spui25.nl/programma/the-european-internet-blockade-of-russian-propagandist-media The European Internet Blockade of Russian Propagandist Media
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| − | * https://t.me/rerussia_eng An expert and discussion platform aiming to address key issues of Russian politics, economy and society. It produces a constantly updated review of current expertise, new data and global discussion on the state of Russia, and publishes its own research
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| − | * MEMO TO META, TWITTER, & GOOGLE: Suspending Russian Government & Affiliated Accounts https://medium.com/@taskforce_51147/141fd0aa0fac
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| − | * Argumentenkaart over Europese Internetblokkade van Russia Today https://ecp.nl/argumentenkaart-over-europese-internetblokkade-van-russia-today-en-sputnik/ in english: https://ecp.nl/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/AK-Internetblokkade-Rusland-EN.pdf
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| − | * https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/world/can-russia-really-disconnect-from-the-rest-of-the-digital-world
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| − | * Russia Is Building Its Own Intependent Internet https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qk329evDDqo | https://labs.ripe.net/author/alexander-isavnin/the-russian-sovereign-internet-and-number-resources/
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| − | * Before a possible internet wall between Russia and the rest of the world is erected, it seems to me a priority to actively invest energy in join, receiving (internet) addresses, proxies, VPNs, satellite options, short golf etc.However, it is necessary that that information is quickly decentralized, through various media.
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| − | * https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/world/can-russia-really-disconnect-from-the-rest-of-the-digital-world
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| − | * The open internet in Russia must be protected. Here’s why https://webfoundation.org/2022/03/the-open-internet-in-russia-must-be-protected-heres-why/
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| − | * Russian internet resources and background https://labs.ripe.net/author/alexander-isavnin/the-russian-sovereign-internet-and-number-resources/
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| − | * How Is Russia Connected To The Wider Internet? https://labs.ripe.net/author/emileaben/how-is-russia-connected-to-the-wider-internet/
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| − | * Meduza is a Russian platform https://save.meduza.io/eu
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| − | * AmneziaVPN is the only service that has supported this petition. One free service for all Russians, accessible through a telegram bot - because all foreign vpn services are blocked or impossible to pay for from Russia. It as one small win for free internet access without https://www.change.org/p/we-call-on-vpn-companies-to-provide-russian-users-with-free-access-to-their-services
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| − | * https://tracking.exposed/pdf/tiktok-russia-15march2022.pdf
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| − | * U.S. Treasury moves to keep Russians connected despite sanctions https://www.accessnow.org/u-s-treasury-russia-sanctions-internet/
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| − | * On March 7, TikTok made all the content posted by non-Russian channels unavailable to Russian users. This unannounced restriction removes an estimated 95% of the content previously available to Russian TikTok users. Content restriction is happening at the application layer rather than the transport layer,which requires the direct involvement of TikTok. It is the first time a global social media platform has restricted access to content at this scale. A network of coordinated accounts is using a loophole to post new content promoting Russian pro-war propaganda in Russia, despite the current ban on new content uploads.
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| − | * https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/yandex-data-center-in-finland-loses-power-runs-on-diesel-due-to-war-sanctions/
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