Difference between revisions of "TacticalMediaRoom/Signal-Disinformation"

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== Information wars ==
 
== Information wars ==
 
=== Tactics and Strategies ===
 
=== Tactics and Strategies ===
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* Application of the Risk Management Framework to Russian Disinformation Campaigns: During the first year of Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine, social media companies enabled the Kremlin to run a large-scale disinformation campaign targeting the European Union and its allies, reaching an aggregate audience of at least 165 million and generating at least 16 billion views. Preliminary analysis suggests that the reach and influence of Kremlin-backed accounts has grown further in the first half of 2023, driven in particular by the dismantling of Twitter’s safety standards. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/c1d645d0-42f5-11ee-a8b8-01aa75ed71a1/language-de
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=== Media Manipulation ===
 
=== Media Manipulation ===
  

Latest revision as of 11:12, 25 July 2024

Back to Signal Main Page


  • https://www.digsum.org/digsum-feed/postdoc-position-to-study-digital-disinformation Postdoc position to study digital disinformation — DIGSUM
  • Application of the Risk Management Framework to Russian Disinformation Campaigns: During the first year of Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine, social media companies enabled the Kremlin to run a large-scale disinformation campaign targeting the European Union and its allies, reaching an aggregate audience of at least 165 million and generating at least 16 billion views. Preliminary analysis suggests that the reach and influence of Kremlin-backed accounts has grown further in the first half of 2023, driven in particular by the dismantling of Twitter’s safety standards.

https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/c1d645d0-42f5-11ee-a8b8-01aa75ed71a1/language-de

  • dataprint

  • datasprint

  • datasprint


Information wars

Tactics and Strategies

  • Application of the Risk Management Framework to Russian Disinformation Campaigns: During the first year of Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine, social media companies enabled the Kremlin to run a large-scale disinformation campaign targeting the European Union and its allies, reaching an aggregate audience of at least 165 million and generating at least 16 billion views. Preliminary analysis suggests that the reach and influence of Kremlin-backed accounts has grown further in the first half of 2023, driven in particular by the dismantling of Twitter’s safety standards. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/c1d645d0-42f5-11ee-a8b8-01aa75ed71a1/language-de

Media Manipulation

  • Wagner-baas: Russen proberen verkiezingen VS met ‘chirurgische precisie’ te beïnvloeden

Na jaren ontkennen heeft Jevgeni Prigozjin, de baas van het Russische huurlingenleger Wagner, toegegeven dat hij heeft geprobeerd de Amerikaanse ve...https://www.volkskrant.nl/a-b6d55dc5

  • An analysis of Dutch pro-Russia tweets — EOOH.eu https://eooh.eu/articles/analysis-of-dutch-pro-russia-tweets
  • TMRers we are trying to collect a list of TikTok accounts and hashtags that do the war, in case anyone has any tips. So far we haven't got too far 🤨 https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1g8gYKZxK8A9migkweIiktz24sNLvnS0aMEPRLBdkpE/edit#gid=q.
  • Yesterday in Belarus they closed a store that sold only books in Belarusian, as they were extremist books. And banned sale of 1984 book.
  • “…. The impact of propaganda is not easily reversible, and sometimes, it is not reversible at all. You may not realize it, of course, but this is, too, how propaganda works. When propaganda engages your unconscious, you may need years to decipher why this particular idea resonated so well with you. “ … similar to trauma , gaslighting, C-PTSD :(

Mensen van free russia gaan aan de demo meedoen hoor ik net An analysis of Dutch pro-Russia tweets — EOOH.eu https://eooh.eu/articles/analysis-of-dutch-pro-russia-tweets

"Blood on your hands" and other surprising anti-#Kremlin messages released by #Russian media outlets on #VictoryDay https://twitter.com/jamnewscaucasus/status/1523927947366875138?s=21&t=M0kSQR2uSsVAhohbYAI8IQ

Propaganda

Ukraine

The propaganda war for Ukraine | DW Documentary https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ifShcUcfbU

Russia

Counter Propaganda Efforts

Russia Propaganda

RT and Sputnik

SK: Blocking RT and Sputnik is not limiting access to information, as these are not independent media but weapons created and lavishly funded by the aggressor. It is blocking agressor state’s weapon on EU territory.
SK:I agree that the post-postmodernist reality has put us in front of a new challenge: while we used to have too little freedom of speech/ access to information and fought to gain more, we have now landed in a situation where we have access to so much information, growing exponentially, that we no longer have the mental capacity or time or resources to discern purposefully false and weaponized statements from true records. What we mostly need is media literacy (stop limiting children’s screen time, let them build up resilience, talk about disinformation) and accessible tools to debunk false information/ disinformation. It’s a huge and difficult dilemma, probably one of the worst of our time, alongside climate change. What I argue about is that now, with the war going on and hundreds of independent Russian journalists having a hard time getting the ends meet and desperately in need of our support, I find it strange that NGOs spend money and human resource on what is essentially helping the aggressor. I know this was not their goal, but this is unfortunately a perfect example of what Lenin called “useful idiots” (people in the West who assisted the bolsheviks without realizing it).

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