P2pbgpsec

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Revision as of 16:59, 18 September 2013 by Becha (talk | contribs) (→‎After PRISM)
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Projects
Participants
Skills
Status Dormant
Niche Software
Purpose Infrastructure

Peer 2 Peer BGP Security

wiki page for participants of p2p-sec mailing list: https://lists.puscii.nl/wws/arc/p2p-sec

Objectives

  • to contribute to creation and implementation of the distributed/decentralized (web-of-trust) BGP security.
  • to create connections between people who share simmilar concerns about the upcoming introduction of hierarchical BGP-security structures, based on PKI/X.509 technology
  • to provide space for disscussion & exchange of opinions, news, materials
  • to co-ordinate the efforts among various groups that work on the above topics

Problem statements

  • Internet Governance view:
    • excellent summary by Milton Mueller, Brenden Kuerbis. (2010,09).
      "Building a new governance hierarchy: RPKI and the future of Internet routing

and addressing. Retrieved from Internet Governance Project: http://internetgovernance.org/pdf/RPKI-VilniusIGPfinal.pdf

    • "Negotiating a New Governance Hierarchy: An Analysis of the

Conflicting Incentives to Secure Internet Routing"
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2021835

  • Techical view:
    • How broken is SSL: a talk by Moxie Marlinspike: "SSL And The Future Of Authenticity" at Defcon 2011:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z7Wl2FW2TcA

    • Basic threat scenario: Man in the Middle attack / prefix hijacking,

presented at Defcon, 2008, by Pilosov/Kapela: http://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-16/dc16-presentations/defcon-16-pilosov-kapela.pdf

    • Enisa report on the routing security: :

http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/res/technologies/tech/routing/state-of-the-art-deployment-and-impact-on-network-resilience

    • Jeroen Massar's presentaton on Routing Security

http://www.swinog.ch/meetings/swinog21/p/14_SwiNOG21%20-%20Security,%20DDOS%20Mitigation,%20AntiSpam.ppt

Possble alternative technical approaches

  • "trust agility", a talk by Moxie Marlinspike: "SSL And The Future Of Authenticity" at Defcon 2011:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z7Wl2FW2TcA

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/11/sovereign-keys-proposal-make-https-and-email-more-secure


Current solution: RPKI & sBGP


Public discussion in European region: (articles, mailing lists, links) http://www.ripe.net/lir-services/resource-management/certification/community-development

In the news:

  • Malcolm Hutty, from London Internet Exchange:

https://publicaffairs.linx.net/news/?p=6118

  • RIPE Members Vote To Continue RPKI Work, Nov 03, 2011 11:44 AM PDT

By Michele Neylon http://www.circleid.com/post/20111103_ripe_members_vote_to_continue_rpki_wo rk/

Meshnets media

See also: Privacy_Software_Workshop_Series#Mesh_networks

& http://wiki.techinc.nl/index.php/Privacy_Software_Workshop_Series#Mesh_networks

  • Becha's article with many links:

http://becha.home.xs4all.nl/hackers-philosophers-utopian-network-dec-2012-becha.pdf

After PRISM

"there's a circumstantial case that the NSA and GCHQ are either directly accessing Certificate Authority keys** or else actively stealing keys from US providers, possibly (or probably) without executives' knowledge. This only requires a small number of people with physical or electronic access to servers, so it's quite feasible.*** The one reason I would have ruled it out a few days ago is because it seems so obviously immoral if not illegal, and moreover a huge threat to the checks and balances that the NSA allegedly has to satisfy in order to access specific users' data via programs such as PRISM."

(NSA breaking crypto, SSL, etc, by Schneider )

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