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Topics related to internet governance and infrastructure, including the friction between free internet and European sanction laws, the closure of ENOG (Eurasian Network Operators' Group), and the future of the internet as discussed by Vint Cerf. It also covers network resilience amid conflict, with specific examples such as the telecommunications blackout in Gaza and network data on power outages in Ukraine. | Topics related to internet governance and infrastructure, including the friction between free internet and European sanction laws, the closure of ENOG (Eurasian Network Operators' Group), and the future of the internet as discussed by Vint Cerf. It also covers network resilience amid conflict, with specific examples such as the telecommunications blackout in Gaza and network data on power outages in Ukraine. | ||
= Global Internet Governance and Sanctions = | = Global Internet Governance and Sanctions = | ||
| + | * Digital commons are a pillar of European digital sovereignty. We have teamed up with a number of organizations working on building Digital Commons and published an op-ed encouraging French and European policy makers to put Digital Commons at the center of the EU’s digital strategy. https://openfuture.eu/blog/digital-commons-are-a-pillar-of-european-digital-sovereignty/ | ||
| + | * So the grassroots are acting, all of us, what an Internet should be. Two of the largest enemy providers, Astra and Allegrosky, have been down for a few days in row. The article also complains that, like StarLink, they somehow can't make it cheap. Orc psychology: I am no expert but I know cringe. Happy to answer any questions. https://www.vedomosti.ru/technology/articles/2024/03/01/1023124-putin-poobeschal-videlit-na-sputnikovii-internet-116-mlrd-rublei | ||
| + | * Interesting read: 13 propositions, and the #12 is about sanctions on the Internet: https://blog.apnic.net/2022/07/19/13-propositions-on-an-internet-for-a-burning-world-12-13/ | ||
* Hoe het vrije internet schuurt met Europese sanctiewetgeving ( Article about how the free internet conflicts with European sanction legislation)- https://www.groene.nl/artikel/altijd-apolitiek-opereren | * Hoe het vrije internet schuurt met Europese sanctiewetgeving ( Article about how the free internet conflicts with European sanction legislation)- https://www.groene.nl/artikel/altijd-apolitiek-opereren | ||
* Internet Society Netherlands: Our open letter to election program committees is online: https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7123449064695738368/ | * Internet Society Netherlands: Our open letter to election program committees is online: https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7123449064695738368/ | ||
| − | + | * An Open Internet Remains the Goal - New from RIPE NCC:https://labs.ripe.net/author/hans_petter_holen/an-open-internet-remains-the-goal/ | |
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| − | * An Open Internet Remains the Goal - | ||
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* What could be done, if there is political will, regarding the "technical sanctions" & blocking of the aggressive regimes/countries/networks:https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/pdf/draft-giuliano-blocking-considerations-00 | * What could be done, if there is political will, regarding the "technical sanctions" & blocking of the aggressive regimes/countries/networks:https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/pdf/draft-giuliano-blocking-considerations-00 | ||
| − | * | + | * Why the RIPE NCC remains fully compliant with the latest sanctions https://labs.ripe.net/author/athina/eu-sanctions-and-our-russian-membership/ |
| − | + | * Internet Society's perspectives on the internet in Ukraine and Russia https://pulse.internetsociety.org/blog/internet-perspectives-ukraine-and-russia | |
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| − | * https://pulse.internetsociety.org/blog/internet-perspectives-ukraine-and-russia | ||
* A More Robust Approach to Sanctions: https://labs.ripe.net/author/chrisb/a-more-robust-approach-to-sanctions/ | * A More Robust Approach to Sanctions: https://labs.ripe.net/author/chrisb/a-more-robust-approach-to-sanctions/ | ||
* Recent events in Ukraine have spotlighted some fundamental questions about Internet governance and the use of state-imposed sanctions. This post frames the discussion in reference to one of the Internet's most enduring maxims.RIPE NCC "position" : https://www.ripe.net/participate/member-support/the-ripe-ncc-and-ukraine-russia/ | * Recent events in Ukraine have spotlighted some fundamental questions about Internet governance and the use of state-imposed sanctions. This post frames the discussion in reference to one of the Internet's most enduring maxims.RIPE NCC "position" : https://www.ripe.net/participate/member-support/the-ripe-ncc-and-ukraine-russia/ | ||
* To sanction or not to sanction the Internet access: A SancNet debate https://www.giga-net.org/to-sanction-or-not-to-sanction-the-internet-access-a-sancnet-debate/ | * To sanction or not to sanction the Internet access: A SancNet debate https://www.giga-net.org/to-sanction-or-not-to-sanction-the-internet-access-a-sancnet-debate/ | ||
| + | * Argument map about the European Internet blockade of Russia Today | ||
| + | ** in Dutch: https://ecp.nl/argumentenkaart-over-europese-internetblokkade-van-russia-today-en-sputnik/ | ||
| + | ** in english: https://ecp.nl/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/AK-Internetblokkade-Rusland-EN.pdf | ||
| + | * The open internet in Russia must be protected. Here’s why https://webfoundation.org/2022/03/the-open-internet-in-russia-must-be-protected-heres-why/ | ||
| + | * U.S. Treasury moves to keep Russians connected despite sanctions https://www.accessnow.org/u-s-treasury-russia-sanctions-internet/ | ||
| + | * https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/yandex-data-center-in-finland-loses-power-runs-on-diesel-due-to-war-sanctions/ | ||
| + | * A Dutch company has the power to cut off Russian organisations from the internet. RIPE NCC is responsible for issuing and managing IP addresses and networks of 76 countries, including Russia and Ukraine. Investigative journalist at Investico Michelle Salomons has investigated how this works. (in Dutch) https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2024/02/15/rusland-internet-ip-adres-amsterdam/ | ||
* History of using sanctions against internet in Serbia (& history of war in ex-yugoslavia ) https://wiki.techinc.nl/TacticalMediaRoom#History | * History of using sanctions against internet in Serbia (& history of war in ex-yugoslavia ) https://wiki.techinc.nl/TacticalMediaRoom#History | ||
| − | * | + | * "Internet splintering due to server-side blocking and embargo sanction" https://twitter.com/francis_scarr/status/1533754156196016128?s=20&t=LoMpjsB25BPCexRpWh2NHA |
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| − | == | + | = Cybersecurity and Network Resilience= |
| + | * Vulnerability of communications lines to the Moscow regime's open embrace of terrorism: | ||
| + | ** https://www.politico.eu/article/telecom-cable-sweden-estonia-damage-nato/ | ||
| + | ** https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pJU-KYMREbQ | ||
| + | * Level Up (https://level-up.cc/) is a community-owned platform designed to gather resources for the global digital safety training community. | ||
| + | * RPKI Training for Ukrainian Network Operators -> The RIPE NCC held online BGP Security training for Ukrainian telecom operators on 6 April: https://labs.ripe.net/author/alex-semenyaka/rpki-training-for-ukrainian-network-operators/ | ||
| + | *Secure communication tools, for non-techies https://labs.ripe.net/author/waehlisch/secure-personal-communication-in-the-event-of-crisis/ | ||
| + | *Telegram harm reduction for users in Russia and Ukraine https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/03/telegram-harm-reduction-users-russia-and-ukraine | ||
| + | * Article about the potential of Russian hackers https://cip.gov.ua/en/news/viktor-zhora-potencial-rosiiskikh-khakeriv-imovirno-pereocinenii | ||
| + | * Financial Times article related to cybersecurity https://www.ft.com/content/1fb2f592-4806-42fd-a6d5-735578651471 | ||
| + | * Article about a cyberattack on Ukrainian telecom https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2022/03/28/huge-cyberattack-on-ukrtelecom-biggest-since-russian-invasion-crashes-ukraine-telecom/?sh=43c99b0d7dc2 | ||
| + | * Article about a phone and internet outage in Ukraine https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/ukraine-kyivstar-outage-down-russia-cyberattack-internet-phone-rcna129582 | ||
| + | * Cyber security and resilience: Lessons from Ukraine https://cyber.harvard.edu/events/cyber-security-and-resilience-lessons-ukraine | ||
| + | * Article about rebuilding networks in Ukraine https://www.heise.de/hintergrund/One-year-of-war-in-Ukraine-Operators-rebuild-networks-in-the-back-of-the-army-7529709.html | ||
| + | * The IT Army of Ukraine Structure, Tasking, and Ecosystem Stefan Soesanto https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Cyber-Reports-2022-06-IT-Army-of-Ukraine.pdf | ||
| + | * The Russification of Ukrainian IP Registration -In this article, Doug Madory uncovers the little-known “Russification” of Ukrainian IP addresses — a phenomenon that complicates the task of internet measurement and impacts Ukrainians connecting to the internet using IP addresses suddenly considered Russian. www.kentik.com & https://www.kentik.com/blog/the-russification-of-ukrainian-ip-registration/ | ||
| + | * Keep Ukraine connect task force https://keepukraineconnected.org | ||
| + | ** story (podcast & article) about the project that was presented at non-public TMR meetup: https://labs.ripe.net/author/alun_davies/keep-ukraine-connected/ | ||
| + | * The international surge to help keep Ukraine's frontlines connected https://www.cyberscoop.com/ukraine-internet-starlink-security/ | ||
| − | + | = Digital Rights and Information Access= | |
| − | * | + | * Vint Cerf Talks The Future Of The Internet - BBC Click https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U2AmxZ3V26s |
| − | + | * Telecommunications blackout in the Gaza Strip is an attack on human rights https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/communications-blackout-gaza-strip/ | |
| − | * https:// | + | * Report shared OONI data analysis on recent blocks that have emerged in Russia(and in the EU) amid the war in Ukraine. https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/ |
| − | + | * Telegram harm reduction for users in Russia and Ukraine https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/03/telegram-harm-reduction-users-russia-and-ukraine | |
| − | * https://www. | + | * AmneziaVPN is the only service that has supported this petition. One free service for all Russians, accessible through a telegram bot - because all foreign vpn services are blocked or impossible to pay for from Russia. It as one small win for free internet access without https://www.change.org/p/we-call-on-vpn-companies-to-provide-russian-users-with-free-access-to-their-services |
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| − | = | + | = Technological Developments in Conflict Zones = |
| − | * | + | * On March 7, TikTok made all the content posted by non-Russian channels unavailable to Russian users. This unannounced restriction removes an estimated 95% of the content previously available to Russian TikTok users. Content restriction is happening at the application layer rather than the transport layer,which requires the direct involvement of TikTok. It is the first time a global social media platform has restricted access to content at this scale. A network of coordinated accounts is using a loophole to post new content promoting Russian pro-war propaganda in Russia, despite the current ban on new content uploads. |
| − | https://www. | + | *Resiliency of the Internet in Ukraine Emile Aben, RIPE NCC https://ripe84.ripe.net/programme/meeting-plan/plenary/ |
| − | + | * In the rubble of bombarded Ukrainian cities, technicians are risking their lives to keep the country online.https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2022/03/22/while-russians-bombs-fall-around-them-ukraines-engineers-battle-to-keep-the-internet-running/?sh=4a20aad35a4c | |
| − | * | + | * https://www.capacitymedia.com/article/29xf7phjbzu764hrrx8g0/kyivstar-works-to-re-connect-ukrainian-cities |
| − | * | + | * Article about measuring Internet resilience in Ukraine https://labs.ripe.net/author/emileaben/the-resilience-of-the-internet-in-ukraine-one-year-on/ |
| + | * Forensic Architecture, about the historical context of the Russian attack on the Kyiv TV tower: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/russian-strike-on-kyiv-tv-tower/ | ||
| + | * 15 nov. 2022: Network data show that most regions of #Ukraine have been impacted by a nation-scale power outage amid intense Russian missile bombardment targeting critical infrastructure; 85 missile strikes confirmed today per President Zelensky 📰 Report: https://t.co/S0qJQ7CbNv” | ||
| + | ** https://twitter.com/netblocks/status/1592549576531234816?s=46&t=PAh-XRummXUmRlxZQsdIBQ | ||
| + | * https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Regional-Presence/Europe/Documents/Interim%20assessment%20on%20damages%20to%20telecommunication%20infrastructure%20and%20resilience%20of%20the%20ICT%20ecosystem%20in%20Ukraine%20-2022-12-22_FINAL.pdf | ||
* Telecom operators in new territories will issue users' IP addresses in Russian - newspaper - https://fomag.ru/news-streem/operatory-svyazi-v-novykh-territoriyakh-oformyat-ip-adresa-polzovateley-na-rossiyskie-gazeta/ | * Telecom operators in new territories will issue users' IP addresses in Russian - newspaper - https://fomag.ru/news-streem/operatory-svyazi-v-novykh-territoriyakh-oformyat-ip-adresa-polzovateley-na-rossiyskie-gazeta/ | ||
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| − | * https:// | + | = Internet Infrastructure and Regional Connectivity = |
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| − | + | * Resiliency of the Internet in Ukraine presentation https://ripe84.ripe.net/programme/meeting-plan/plenary/ | |
| − | + | * How Is Russia Connected To The Wider Internet? https://labs.ripe.net/author/emileaben/how-is-russia-connected-to-the-wider-internet/ | |
| + | * https://labs.ripe.net/author/alexander-isavnin/the-russian-sovereign-internet-and-number-resources/ | ||
| + | * Russia Is Building Its Own Intependent Internet https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qk329evDDqo | | ||
| + | * Before a possible internet wall between Russia and the rest of the world is erected, it seems to me a priority to actively invest energy in join, receiving (internet) addresses, proxies, VPNs, satellite options, short golf etc.However, it is necessary that that information is quickly decentralized, through various media. https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/world/can-russia-really-disconnect-from-the-rest-of-the-digital-world | ||
| + | * Russian internet resources and background https://labs.ripe.net/author/alexander-isavnin/the-russian-sovereign-internet-and-number-resources/ | ||
* https://pulse.internetsociety.org/blog/internet-infrastructure-predictions-for-2023-ukraine-internet-to-prevail-central-asia-to-increase-internet-resiliance-in-response-to-war | * https://pulse.internetsociety.org/blog/internet-infrastructure-predictions-for-2023-ukraine-internet-to-prevail-central-asia-to-increase-internet-resiliance-in-response-to-war | ||
| − | * | + | * ENOG (Eurasian Network Operators' Group) was established in June 2011 as a means to bring RIPE and the RIPE NCC closer to the local communities in Eurasia and to support Internet |
| − | * | + | ** chaser: https://www.parisbeacon.com/ripe-ncc-shuts-down-exchange-platform-with-russia/ |
| − | * | + | ** original: https://www.enog.org |
| − | + | ** discussion: https://enog-apps-2.ripe.net/hyperkitty/list/discuss@enog.org/thread/XGEYIYQWC6MRZ2VXEERH3QLDFU7XFCSD/ | |
| − | * https://www. | + | * About the ENOG group https://www.ripe.net/publications/news/announcements/sunsetting-enog |
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| − | = | + | = Cyber Warfare and Digital Activism= |
| − | * | + | * Report on TikTok's algorithm and its impact in Russia https://tracking.exposed/pdf/tiktok-russia-15march2022.pdf |
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* MEMO TO META, TWITTER, & GOOGLE: Suspending Russian Government & Affiliated Accounts https://medium.com/@taskforce_51147/141fd0aa0fac | * MEMO TO META, TWITTER, & GOOGLE: Suspending Russian Government & Affiliated Accounts https://medium.com/@taskforce_51147/141fd0aa0fac | ||
| − | * | + | * The European Internet Blockade of Russian Propagandist Media https://www.spui25.nl/programma/the-european-internet-blockade-of-russian-propagandist-media |
| − | + | * Moscow’s main internet provider, Akado Telecom, has been reported down for a third time since December, allegedly knocking out wifi access for several of Moscow's government agencies, https://cybernews.com/cyber-war/russia-fsb-akado-internet-down-ukraine-it-army/ | |
| − | + | * Dattalion – Ukraine's Data Battalion. Today at 14:30 (EEST), me and my colleagues are going to hold the first media briefing of Dattalion at Ukraine Media Center. The link to the event is available here https://youtu.be/d6HHk7u98Bc | |
| − | * | + | * Anonymous hacktivists warned that the next #OpRussia target will be corporations that refuse to pull their business from Russia as one group of hackers decided to try to use their data haul from a Russian company to financially help the people of Ukraine.https://www.hstoday.us/featured/anonymous-hackers-fire-warning-shot-at-companies-refusing-to-pull-out-of-russia/ |
| − | + | * Cryptography has failed to address the needs of the disenfranchised.But we can fix that! https://uwaterloo.ca/cybersecurity-privacy-institute/cpi-talk-crypto-people | |
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Latest revision as of 12:58, 26 July 2024
Back to Signal Main Page
Topics related to internet governance and infrastructure, including the friction between free internet and European sanction laws, the closure of ENOG (Eurasian Network Operators' Group), and the future of the internet as discussed by Vint Cerf. It also covers network resilience amid conflict, with specific examples such as the telecommunications blackout in Gaza and network data on power outages in Ukraine.
Contents
Global Internet Governance and Sanctions
- Digital commons are a pillar of European digital sovereignty. We have teamed up with a number of organizations working on building Digital Commons and published an op-ed encouraging French and European policy makers to put Digital Commons at the center of the EU’s digital strategy. https://openfuture.eu/blog/digital-commons-are-a-pillar-of-european-digital-sovereignty/
- So the grassroots are acting, all of us, what an Internet should be. Two of the largest enemy providers, Astra and Allegrosky, have been down for a few days in row. The article also complains that, like StarLink, they somehow can't make it cheap. Orc psychology: I am no expert but I know cringe. Happy to answer any questions. https://www.vedomosti.ru/technology/articles/2024/03/01/1023124-putin-poobeschal-videlit-na-sputnikovii-internet-116-mlrd-rublei
- Interesting read: 13 propositions, and the #12 is about sanctions on the Internet: https://blog.apnic.net/2022/07/19/13-propositions-on-an-internet-for-a-burning-world-12-13/
- Hoe het vrije internet schuurt met Europese sanctiewetgeving ( Article about how the free internet conflicts with European sanction legislation)- https://www.groene.nl/artikel/altijd-apolitiek-opereren
- Internet Society Netherlands: Our open letter to election program committees is online: https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7123449064695738368/
- An Open Internet Remains the Goal - New from RIPE NCC:https://labs.ripe.net/author/hans_petter_holen/an-open-internet-remains-the-goal/
- What could be done, if there is political will, regarding the "technical sanctions" & blocking of the aggressive regimes/countries/networks:https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/pdf/draft-giuliano-blocking-considerations-00
- Why the RIPE NCC remains fully compliant with the latest sanctions https://labs.ripe.net/author/athina/eu-sanctions-and-our-russian-membership/
- Internet Society's perspectives on the internet in Ukraine and Russia https://pulse.internetsociety.org/blog/internet-perspectives-ukraine-and-russia
- A More Robust Approach to Sanctions: https://labs.ripe.net/author/chrisb/a-more-robust-approach-to-sanctions/
- Recent events in Ukraine have spotlighted some fundamental questions about Internet governance and the use of state-imposed sanctions. This post frames the discussion in reference to one of the Internet's most enduring maxims.RIPE NCC "position" : https://www.ripe.net/participate/member-support/the-ripe-ncc-and-ukraine-russia/
- To sanction or not to sanction the Internet access: A SancNet debate https://www.giga-net.org/to-sanction-or-not-to-sanction-the-internet-access-a-sancnet-debate/
- Argument map about the European Internet blockade of Russia Today
- The open internet in Russia must be protected. Here’s why https://webfoundation.org/2022/03/the-open-internet-in-russia-must-be-protected-heres-why/
- U.S. Treasury moves to keep Russians connected despite sanctions https://www.accessnow.org/u-s-treasury-russia-sanctions-internet/
- https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/yandex-data-center-in-finland-loses-power-runs-on-diesel-due-to-war-sanctions/
- A Dutch company has the power to cut off Russian organisations from the internet. RIPE NCC is responsible for issuing and managing IP addresses and networks of 76 countries, including Russia and Ukraine. Investigative journalist at Investico Michelle Salomons has investigated how this works. (in Dutch) https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2024/02/15/rusland-internet-ip-adres-amsterdam/
- History of using sanctions against internet in Serbia (& history of war in ex-yugoslavia ) https://wiki.techinc.nl/TacticalMediaRoom#History
- "Internet splintering due to server-side blocking and embargo sanction" https://twitter.com/francis_scarr/status/1533754156196016128?s=20&t=LoMpjsB25BPCexRpWh2NHA
Cybersecurity and Network Resilience
- Vulnerability of communications lines to the Moscow regime's open embrace of terrorism:
- Level Up (https://level-up.cc/) is a community-owned platform designed to gather resources for the global digital safety training community.
- RPKI Training for Ukrainian Network Operators -> The RIPE NCC held online BGP Security training for Ukrainian telecom operators on 6 April: https://labs.ripe.net/author/alex-semenyaka/rpki-training-for-ukrainian-network-operators/
- Secure communication tools, for non-techies https://labs.ripe.net/author/waehlisch/secure-personal-communication-in-the-event-of-crisis/
- Telegram harm reduction for users in Russia and Ukraine https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/03/telegram-harm-reduction-users-russia-and-ukraine
- Article about the potential of Russian hackers https://cip.gov.ua/en/news/viktor-zhora-potencial-rosiiskikh-khakeriv-imovirno-pereocinenii
- Financial Times article related to cybersecurity https://www.ft.com/content/1fb2f592-4806-42fd-a6d5-735578651471
- Article about a cyberattack on Ukrainian telecom https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2022/03/28/huge-cyberattack-on-ukrtelecom-biggest-since-russian-invasion-crashes-ukraine-telecom/?sh=43c99b0d7dc2
- Article about a phone and internet outage in Ukraine https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/ukraine-kyivstar-outage-down-russia-cyberattack-internet-phone-rcna129582
- Cyber security and resilience: Lessons from Ukraine https://cyber.harvard.edu/events/cyber-security-and-resilience-lessons-ukraine
- Article about rebuilding networks in Ukraine https://www.heise.de/hintergrund/One-year-of-war-in-Ukraine-Operators-rebuild-networks-in-the-back-of-the-army-7529709.html
- The IT Army of Ukraine Structure, Tasking, and Ecosystem Stefan Soesanto https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Cyber-Reports-2022-06-IT-Army-of-Ukraine.pdf
- The Russification of Ukrainian IP Registration -In this article, Doug Madory uncovers the little-known “Russification” of Ukrainian IP addresses — a phenomenon that complicates the task of internet measurement and impacts Ukrainians connecting to the internet using IP addresses suddenly considered Russian. www.kentik.com & https://www.kentik.com/blog/the-russification-of-ukrainian-ip-registration/
- Keep Ukraine connect task force https://keepukraineconnected.org
- story (podcast & article) about the project that was presented at non-public TMR meetup: https://labs.ripe.net/author/alun_davies/keep-ukraine-connected/
- The international surge to help keep Ukraine's frontlines connected https://www.cyberscoop.com/ukraine-internet-starlink-security/
Digital Rights and Information Access
- Vint Cerf Talks The Future Of The Internet - BBC Click https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U2AmxZ3V26s
- Telecommunications blackout in the Gaza Strip is an attack on human rights https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/communications-blackout-gaza-strip/
- Report shared OONI data analysis on recent blocks that have emerged in Russia(and in the EU) amid the war in Ukraine. https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/
- Telegram harm reduction for users in Russia and Ukraine https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/03/telegram-harm-reduction-users-russia-and-ukraine
- AmneziaVPN is the only service that has supported this petition. One free service for all Russians, accessible through a telegram bot - because all foreign vpn services are blocked or impossible to pay for from Russia. It as one small win for free internet access without https://www.change.org/p/we-call-on-vpn-companies-to-provide-russian-users-with-free-access-to-their-services
Technological Developments in Conflict Zones
- On March 7, TikTok made all the content posted by non-Russian channels unavailable to Russian users. This unannounced restriction removes an estimated 95% of the content previously available to Russian TikTok users. Content restriction is happening at the application layer rather than the transport layer,which requires the direct involvement of TikTok. It is the first time a global social media platform has restricted access to content at this scale. A network of coordinated accounts is using a loophole to post new content promoting Russian pro-war propaganda in Russia, despite the current ban on new content uploads.
- Resiliency of the Internet in Ukraine Emile Aben, RIPE NCC https://ripe84.ripe.net/programme/meeting-plan/plenary/
- In the rubble of bombarded Ukrainian cities, technicians are risking their lives to keep the country online.https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2022/03/22/while-russians-bombs-fall-around-them-ukraines-engineers-battle-to-keep-the-internet-running/?sh=4a20aad35a4c
- https://www.capacitymedia.com/article/29xf7phjbzu764hrrx8g0/kyivstar-works-to-re-connect-ukrainian-cities
- Article about measuring Internet resilience in Ukraine https://labs.ripe.net/author/emileaben/the-resilience-of-the-internet-in-ukraine-one-year-on/
- Forensic Architecture, about the historical context of the Russian attack on the Kyiv TV tower: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/russian-strike-on-kyiv-tv-tower/
- 15 nov. 2022: Network data show that most regions of #Ukraine have been impacted by a nation-scale power outage amid intense Russian missile bombardment targeting critical infrastructure; 85 missile strikes confirmed today per President Zelensky 📰 Report: https://t.co/S0qJQ7CbNv”
- https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Regional-Presence/Europe/Documents/Interim%20assessment%20on%20damages%20to%20telecommunication%20infrastructure%20and%20resilience%20of%20the%20ICT%20ecosystem%20in%20Ukraine%20-2022-12-22_FINAL.pdf
- Telecom operators in new territories will issue users' IP addresses in Russian - newspaper - https://fomag.ru/news-streem/operatory-svyazi-v-novykh-territoriyakh-oformyat-ip-adresa-polzovateley-na-rossiyskie-gazeta/
Internet Infrastructure and Regional Connectivity
- Resiliency of the Internet in Ukraine presentation https://ripe84.ripe.net/programme/meeting-plan/plenary/
- How Is Russia Connected To The Wider Internet? https://labs.ripe.net/author/emileaben/how-is-russia-connected-to-the-wider-internet/
- https://labs.ripe.net/author/alexander-isavnin/the-russian-sovereign-internet-and-number-resources/
- Russia Is Building Its Own Intependent Internet https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qk329evDDqo |
- Before a possible internet wall between Russia and the rest of the world is erected, it seems to me a priority to actively invest energy in join, receiving (internet) addresses, proxies, VPNs, satellite options, short golf etc.However, it is necessary that that information is quickly decentralized, through various media. https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/world/can-russia-really-disconnect-from-the-rest-of-the-digital-world
- Russian internet resources and background https://labs.ripe.net/author/alexander-isavnin/the-russian-sovereign-internet-and-number-resources/
- https://pulse.internetsociety.org/blog/internet-infrastructure-predictions-for-2023-ukraine-internet-to-prevail-central-asia-to-increase-internet-resiliance-in-response-to-war
- ENOG (Eurasian Network Operators' Group) was established in June 2011 as a means to bring RIPE and the RIPE NCC closer to the local communities in Eurasia and to support Internet
- About the ENOG group https://www.ripe.net/publications/news/announcements/sunsetting-enog
Cyber Warfare and Digital Activism
- Report on TikTok's algorithm and its impact in Russia https://tracking.exposed/pdf/tiktok-russia-15march2022.pdf
- MEMO TO META, TWITTER, & GOOGLE: Suspending Russian Government & Affiliated Accounts https://medium.com/@taskforce_51147/141fd0aa0fac
- The European Internet Blockade of Russian Propagandist Media https://www.spui25.nl/programma/the-european-internet-blockade-of-russian-propagandist-media
- Moscow’s main internet provider, Akado Telecom, has been reported down for a third time since December, allegedly knocking out wifi access for several of Moscow's government agencies, https://cybernews.com/cyber-war/russia-fsb-akado-internet-down-ukraine-it-army/
- Dattalion – Ukraine's Data Battalion. Today at 14:30 (EEST), me and my colleagues are going to hold the first media briefing of Dattalion at Ukraine Media Center. The link to the event is available here https://youtu.be/d6HHk7u98Bc
- Anonymous hacktivists warned that the next #OpRussia target will be corporations that refuse to pull their business from Russia as one group of hackers decided to try to use their data haul from a Russian company to financially help the people of Ukraine.https://www.hstoday.us/featured/anonymous-hackers-fire-warning-shot-at-companies-refusing-to-pull-out-of-russia/
- Cryptography has failed to address the needs of the disenfranchised.But we can fix that! https://uwaterloo.ca/cybersecurity-privacy-institute/cpi-talk-crypto-people
