P2pbgpsec

Projects
Participants
Skills
Status	Dormant
Niche	Software
Purpose	Infrastructure

Peer 2 Peer BGP Security

wiki page for participants of p2p-sec mailing list: https://lists.puscii.nl/wws/arc/p2p-sec

Objectives

• to contribute to creation and implementation of the distributed/decentralized (web-of-trust) BGP security.
• to create connections between people who share simmilar concerns about the upcoming introduction of hierarchical BGP-security structures, based on PKI/X.509 technology
• to provide space for disscussion & exchange of opinions, news, materials
• to co-ordinate the efforts among various groups that work on the above topics

Problem statements

Internet Governance view

• • excellent summary by Milton Mueller, Brenden Kuerbis. (2010,09).
    

"Building a new governance hierarchy: RPKI and the future of Internet routing     and addressing. 

Retrieved from Internet Governance Project: http://internetgovernance.org/pdf/RPKI-VilniusIGPfinal.pdf

• • "Negotiating a New Governance Hierarchy: An Analysis of the Conflicting Incentives to Secure Internet Routing"
    

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2021835

Technical view

• How broken is SSL: a talk by Moxie Marlinspike: "SSL And The Future Of Authenticity" at Defcon 2011:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z7Wl2FW2TcA

• Basic threat scenario: Man in the Middle attack / prefix hijacking, presented at Defcon, 2008, by Pilosov/Kapela:
  • http://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-16/dc16-presentations/defcon-16-pilosov-kapela.pdf
  • https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oWdjsfsS_Do . YouTube - DEF CON 16 - Anton Kapela & Alex Pilosov: Stealing The Internet

• Enisa report on the routing security: :

http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/res/technologies/tech/routing/state-of-the-art-deployment-and-impact-on-network-resilience

• Jeroen Massar's presentaton on Routing Security

http://www.swinog.ch/meetings/swinog21/p/14_SwiNOG21%20-%20Security,%20DDOS%20Mitigation,%20AntiSpam.ppt

• Sharon Goldberg: Should we secure routing with the RPKI (19 September 2013) , Princeton CS

http://www.cs.princeton.edu/ajax/abstract/467

• Is the Juice Worth the Squeeze? BGP Security in Partial Deployment

Robert Lychev, Sharon Goldberg, Michael Schapira. SIGCOMM'13, Hong Kong, China. August 2013.

  http://arxiv.org/pdf/1307.2690v1
  http://arxiv.org/abs/1307.2690

• Impacting IP Prefix Reachability via RPKI Manipulations

Kyle Brogle, Danny Cooper, Sharon Goldberg and Leonid Reyzin. Boston University Technical Report. January 4, 2013.

  http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe/papers/RPKImanip.pdf
  http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe/papers/RPKImanip.html

• (October 08, 2013) Threat Model for BGP Path Security

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-07

• From the Consent of the Routed: Improving the Transparency of the RPKI; Ethan Heilman, Danny Cooper, Leonid Reyzin and Sharon Goldberg.

SIGCOMM'14, Chicago, IL. August 2014. http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe/papers/sigRPKI_full.pdf

• On the Risk of Misbehaving RPKI Authorities; Danny Cooper, Ethan Heilman, Kyle Brogle, Leonid Reyzin and Sharon Goldberg. http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe/papers/hotRPKI_full.pdf
  • Hardening RPKI against misbehaving authorities http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe/papers/RPKImanip.html

• November 2014, RIPE69: Job Snijders on *not* recommending RPKI: https://ripe69.ripe.net/archives/video/184 / https://ripe69.ripe.net/wp-content/uploads/presentations/46-jobsnijders_ripe69_golden_prefixes.pdf

• November 2014 IETF91 http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe/papers/goldberg_sidr_ietf91.pdf

• https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-grow-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-04

• Nanog, autumn 2014: why TWC is NOT going to deploy RPKI: https://www.nanog.org/sites/default/files/wednesday_george_adventuresinrpki_62.9.pdf

• Nanog, June 2015: http://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2015-June/075687.html

"There are also potentially significant drawbacks to incorporating PKI into the routing space, including new potential DoS vectors against PKI-enabled routing elements, the potential for enumeration of routing elements, and the possibility of building a true 'Internet kill switch' with effects far beyond what various governmental bodies have managed to do so far in the DNS space.

Once governments figured out what the DNS was, they started to use it as a ban-hammer - what happens in a PKIed routing system once they figure out what BGP is? "

"So, what happens when the authorities in some locale start pressing for the cancellation of relevant certificates utilized in routing PKI, and/or order operators under their jurisdiction to reject same? "

• Another view on "why is the Internet Broken" https://medium.com/@cdn77/why-the-internet-is-broken-4962cdbbd664#.w6osajcyu

• Bamboozling Certificate Authorities with BGP , 27th USENIX Security Symposium. August 15–17, 2018 • Baltimore, MD, USA
  • https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity18/sec18-birge-lee.pdf

reported problems in blogs and news

2023:

• https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/australian-telco-optus-ceo-resigns-days-after-network-wide-outage-2023-11-19/
• https://www.capacitymedia.com/article/2cfchogig2pgc1wnzfgg0/news/what-caused-australias-major-optus-outage

2022:

• February 28, 2022: Inquiry into Secure Internet Routing (i.e. what is wrong with BGP :-)) https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-22-18A1.pdf

2021:

• overview: https://event.on24.com/wcc/r/3603248/27BF652060BB7FCC403076E81F5006D5
• facebook.. labs...
• https://dev.hicube.caida.org/feeds/hijacks/events/moas/moas-1612540200-13414_136168/104.244.42.0-24
• https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1389128621000207

2020:

• https://www.itnews.com.au/news/telstra-routing-flub-affects-hundreds-of-networks-worldwide-554097
• https://exchange.telstra.com.au/an-update-on-our-september-30-bgp-issue/

2015:

• https://www.security.nl/posting/437378/Kamervragen+over+gekaapte+IP-adressen+Buitenlandse+Zaken
• http://tweakers.net/nieuws/104414/bulgaarse-criminelen-misbruikten-ip-adressen-nederlandse-overheid.html

2016:

• http://research.dyn.com/2016/03/ukraine-emerges-as-bogus-routing-source/

• Sharon Goldberg @goldbe "Slides from my three hour tutorial on BGP security at the Technion TCE Summer School on Computer Security" http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe/papers/BGPsecurityGoldbe.pdf

2018:

• http://blog.ipspace.net/2017/12/bgp-tragedy-of-commons.html
• https://blog.apnic.net/2018/01/16/really-need-new-bgp/

Heartbleed

• http://xkcd.com/1354/

• http://lorddoig.svbtle.com/heartbleed-should-bleed-x509-to-death

• http://lorddoig.svbtle.com/should-we-make-a-working-group-to-kill-x509

Possible alternative technical approaches

• "trust agility", a talk by Moxie Marlinspike: "SSL And The Future Of Authenticity" at Defcon 2011:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z7Wl2FW2TcA

• http://convergence.io/

• Soveregn Keys, Peter Eckersley from EFF mp4 HQmp4 LQ

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/11/sovereign-keys-proposal-make-https-and-email-more-secure

• "Trusted BGP Observers, an extension to RPKI"

• October 21, 2013: "Evolving the Web Public Key Infrastructure", IAB Security Program

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tschofenig-iab-webpki-evolution-00

• Various suggestions in comments on Scheider's blog post about Renesys artcle, November 2013

https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/11/rerouting_inter.html

• October 2014: Job Snijders - Golden Prefixes: http://nlnog.com/dag2014/archive/3_nlnogdag2014_job_snijders_bgp_rpki.pdf

• "Dovetail: Stronger Anonymity in Next-Generation Internet Routing" 2014, PET symposium:

https://www.petsymposium.org/2014/papers/Sankey.pdf

Current solutions

IRR

• https://blog.apnic.net/2022/04/07/irr-hygiene-in-the-rpki-era/
• https://wiki.techinc.nl/User:Becha/DeeperBGP
• securing bgp, Vesna's talk at 2007 ccc camp https://becha.home.xs4all.nl/routing-registry-bgp-tutorial.pdf

RPKI & sBGP

• IETF wg: SIDR (secure InterDomain Routing)
  • e.g. http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats/
• Software: http://www.rpki.net/
• RIPE NCC: https://www.ripe.net/lir-services/resource-management/certification
• Public discussion in European region: (articles, mailing lists, links)

http://www.ripe.net/lir-services/resource-management/certification/community-development

• NIST document (July 2017) https://nccoe.nist.gov/sites/default/files/library/project-descriptions/sidr-project-description-final.pdf "SECURE INTER- DOMAIN ROUTING , Part 1: Route Hijacks"

• 2015: http://conferences.sigcomm.org/sigcomm/2015/pdf/papers/p115.pdf

In the news & blogs

See also: https://wiki.techinc.nl/Internet_Governance_and_hackers#News 

2010-2015

• + 2006: https://slashdot.org/story/06/05/08/142229/what-happened-to-blue-security

• 2010: Will feds mandate Internet routing security?, By Carolyn Duffy Marsan, Network World | DECEMBER 15, 2010

https://www.networkworld.com/article/2196832/will-feds-mandate-internet-routing-security-.html

• https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ietf/7zKmscmqRB102PC7T3ToJCeDXFk/

• RIPE Members Vote To Continue RPKI Work, Nov 03, 2011 11:44 AM PDT , By Michele Nylon

http://www.circleid.com/post/20111103_ripe_members_vote_to_continue_rpki_wo rk/

• 2011: Malcolm Hutty, from London Internet Exchange: https://archive.is/Tinl9 => https://publicaffairs.linx.net/news/?p=6118

• RPKI for PI users in RIPE region: http://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/ncc-services-wg/2013-March/002212.html

• NANOG: Single trust anchor?

http://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2013-August/060199.html

• (after PRISM) "there's a circumstantial case that the NSA and GCHQ are either directly accessing Certificate Authority keys** or else actively stealing keys from US providers, possibly (or probably) without executives' knowledge. This only requires a small number of people with physical or electronic access to servers, so it's quite feasible.*** The one reason I would have ruled it out a few days ago is because it seems so obviously immoral if not illegal, and moreover a huge threat to the checks and balances that the NSA allegedly has to satisfy in order to access specific users' data via programs such as PRISM."

http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/on-nsa.html

• (NSA breaking crypto, SSL, etc, by Schneider) https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/the_nsa_is_brea.html

• GOVERNMENTS WANT SUSPENDERS FOR SECURE ROUTING (24 September 2013)

http://www.internetgovernance.org/2013/09/24/keep-your-pants-on-governments-want-suspenders-for-secure-routing/

• "...allowing the US the power to arbitrarily shut countries off the net is [...] what deployment of DNSSEC and the rPKI under the current models would do.

http://www.circleid.com/posts/20131027_nobody_has_proposed_sustainable_model_for_internet_governance_yet/

• CSRIC/ Secure BGP deployment, March 2013 http://www.renesys.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/CSRIC-III-WG6-Presentation-20130314.pdf

• IETF in Vancouver, Sept-November 2013 (after Snowden)

https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/take_back_the_i.html
http://www.ietf.org/blog/2013/09/security-and-pervasive-monitoring/
http://www.ietf.org/blog/2013/11/strengthening-the-internet/
http://www.ietf.org/blog/2013/11/we-will-strengthen-the-internet/
http://www.ietf.org/media/2013-11-07-internet-privacy-and-security.html
http://www.economist.com/news/science-and-technology/21589383-stung-revelations-ubiquitous-surveillance-and-compromised-software/

• EXCELLENT OVERVIEW, philosophically, ethically & technically : http://geer.tinho.net/geer.uncc.9x13.txt

.Tradeoffs in Cyber Security
.Dan Geer, 9 October 13, UNCC

• December 21013: http://www.internetsociety.org/blog/2013/12/resilience-commons-addressing-routing-security-challenges
  • http://www.internetsociety.org/doc/relisence-commons-routing-security // http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/bp-resilience-20131217-en..pdf

• November 2014: http://research.dyn.com/2014/11/chinese-routing-errors-redirect-russian-traffic/

• September 11, 2014 ACM Volume 12, issue 8 "Why Is It Taking So Long to Secure Internet Routing?" Sharon Goldberg, Boston University http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2668966 // http://dl.acm.org/ft_gateway.cfm?id=2668966&ftid=1500097&dwn=1

• June 2015: http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/business/2015/05/31/net-of-insecurity-part-2/

"For now — after years of warnings by Perlman, Bellovin, Kent, Clarke and many others — perhaps 
the most telling statistic is the percentage of Internet traffic currently secured by the 
new system of cryptographic network keys: zero."

• Securing the Internet Routing: Will the SIDR model succeed where the IRR model failed? http://blog.apnic.net/2015/06/01/will-the-sidr-model-succeed-where-the-irr-model-failed-part-i/ & http://blog.apnic.net/2015/06/01/will-the-sidr-model-succeed-where-the-irr-model-failed-part-ii/

2022

• https://blog.apnic.net/2022/04/07/irr-hygiene-in-the-rpki-era/

• https://www.internetsociety.org/resources/doc/2022/internet-impact-brief-how-refusing-russian-networks-will-impact-the-internet/

• https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/03/wartime-bad-time-mess-internet

• suggestions to use routing to block internet in russia: https://www.pch.net/resources/Papers/Multistakeholder-Imposition-of-Internet-Sanctions.pdf
• https://www.theregister.com/2022/03/10/internet_russia_sanctions/
• MORE: https://wiki.techinc.nl/TacticalMediaRoom#News

2023

• https://www.kentik.com/blog/a-tale-of-two-bgp-leaks/

• https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/australian-telco-optus-ceo-resigns-days-after-network-wide-outage-2023-11-19/

• RPKI's 2023 Year in Review https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2024-January/224318.html

• https://labs.ripe.net/author/gih/models-of-trust-for-the-rpki/

2024

• https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2024/05/us-department-commerce-implements-internet-routing-security
• Marco D'Itri & ARIN: https://www.linux.it/~md/text/rs-arinlegacy-rswg2024.pdf
• Massimo https://packetvis.com/blog/rpki-trust-anchor-malfunctions/
• https://youtu.be/Xd6evqMe5H0?si=FzNyBWw9l68ZEf8I
• orange_spain_outage_breach : https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hacker-hijacks-orange-spain-ripe-account-to-cause-bgp-havoc/ & https://benjojo.co.uk/u/benjojo/h/r1zj333N4L6cF7P1xv & https://doublepulsar.com/how-50-of-telco-orange-spains-traffic-got-hijacked-a-weak-password-d7cde085b0c5 & https://www.ripe.net/publications/news/ripe-ncc-access-security-breach-investigation & https://www.theregister.com/2024/01/04/orange_spain_outage_breach/ & https://arstechnica.com/security/2024/01/a-ridiculously-weak-password-causes-disaster-for-spains-no-2-mobile-carrier/ & https://www.kentik.com/blog/digging-into-the-orange-espana-hack/ & https://nanog.org/stories/industry-news/digging-into-the-orange-espana-hack/ ** https://blog.benjojo.co.uk/post/rpki-signed-but-not-secure

• paper authentication! https://www.first.org/blog/20231222-Is-the-LoA-DoA-for-Routing

Meshnets media

See also:

• https://wiki.techinc.nl/index.php/MeshNet
• Privacy_Software_Workshop_Series#Mesh_networks
• Becha's article with many links:

http://becha.home.xs4all.nl/hackers-philosophers-utopian-network-dec-2012-becha.pdf