

IPv6 and security

More bits, more vulns!

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Introduction - about us

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Introduction - about IPv6

- Many new features
 - Neighbor Discovery
 - Extension headers
 - Multicast over broadcast
 - Address scopes
- LANs depend on trust
 - No authentication between hosts
 - More features => more trust dependency
- Dual stack problems
 - Security policy discrepancies
 - Unintended dual stack reachability

Scanning IPV6 ranges

- Address patterns
- Discovery methods
- Address Assignment methods
- Example(s)
- Countermeasures

Address patterns:

- SLAAC (Interface-ID based on the MAC address)
- ☐ IPv4-based (e.g., 2001:db8::192.168.10.1)
- ☐ “Low byte” (e.g., 2001:db8::1, 2001:db8::2, etc.)
- ☐ Privacy Addresses (Random Interface-IDs)
- ☐ “Wordy” (e.g., 2001:db8::dead:beef)
- ☐ Related to specific transition-co-existence technologies (e.g., Teredo)

Host Discovery - Internal

This is the "easy" part, but even here full ping sweeps are impractical.

- Multicast
 - Send ICMPv6 echo request packet to the all-nodes link-local multicast address (ff02::1)
- SLAAC
 - Send ICMPv6 RA packet which causes hosts to begin SLAAC and send a solicitation for their newly configured address.

Host Discovery - External

Turns out to be quite doable too :)

- DNS Based:
 - advertised hostnames/ranges (such as MX records and AS names)
 - common hostnames (such as webmail.domain.tld)
 - patterns in hostnames (colo123.ipv6.domain.tld)
 - reverse lookups (ip6.arpa)
- Public information (google/bing, mailing lists, etc)
- Common/Default ip's (::0, ::1, ::2, ::80, :443, ::babe, ::b00b, ::1000-2000, etc.)

Examples

- Discovery, AS3265:
 - 2001:0888::/30 Xs4all Internet BV
 - 4300 subnets discovered
 - 1881 ip6.arpa records (partial scan):
 - 52 percent ::1, 46 percent ::2
 - xs4all###.ipv6.xs4all.nl, vlan5.swcolo2.3d2.xs4all.net, etc
- Why do i care?
 - cwi.nl (port 80 on ipv4, port 22,80,443 on v6)
 - mediamatic.nl (p80 on v4, p22,80,873,8080 on v6)
 - etc..

Solutions?

- The issue is different for servers and clients.
- SLAAC (MAC used as basis for least significant digits)
- DHCPv6 with Temporary addresses


//this is not a new problem: nuance.

Fragmentation attacks


- IPv4 had issues with fragmentation
 - Overlapping fragments
 - Tiny fragments
- Firewalls use 5-tuple
 - src and dst port
 - src and dst addr
 - flags
- Decide on first fragment
 - All info fits in there, right?

Fragmentation in IPv4


Original



Fragment 1




Fragment 2



Tiny fragment attack


Fragmentation in IPv4



Overlapping
fragment attack

Fragmentation in IPv6


Original



Fragment 1



Fragment 2



RA flooding

I did not have enough time to finish this, and since all of you are using linux (the one OS that doesn't halt/slow down on RA floods) this slide is here so we can have a short discussion about how vendors are not acknowledging ipv6 issues.

RA flooding effectively halts windows 8, windows server 2008, and slows down OSX.

SLAAC attack

- Example of dual-stack badness
- Doesn't require IPv6 network!
- Create IPv6 layover network
- Most OSs choose IPv6 by default
- Offer connectivity
- MitM away!

SLAAC attack

Attacker
10.0.0.10
2001:db8::1



IPv4 gateway
10.0.0.1




Internet




Victim
10.0.0.11


SLAAC attack



SLAAC attack



SLAAC attack



SLAAC attack

